Loving Animals: Toward a New Animal Advocacy by Kathy Rudy by Santana, Elana
The Goose
Volume 13 | No. 2 Article 29
2-24-2015
Loving Animals: Toward a New Animal Advocacy
by Kathy Rudy
Elana Santana
York University
Part of the Animal Studies Commons, Critical and Cultural Studies Commons, Literature in
English, North America Commons, Nature and Society Relations Commons, and the Place and
Environment Commons
Follow this and additional works at / Suivez-nous ainsi que d’autres travaux et œuvres:
https://scholars.wlu.ca/thegoose
This article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Goose by an
authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.
Cet article vous est accessible gratuitement et en libre accès grâce à Scholars Commons @ Laurier. Le texte a été approuvé pour faire partie intégrante
de la revue The Goose par un rédacteur autorisé de Scholars Commons @ Laurier. Pour de plus amples informations, contactez
scholarscommons@wlu.ca.
Recommended Citation / Citation recommandée
Santana, Elana. "Loving Animals: Toward a New Animal Advocacy by Kathy Rudy." The Goose, vol. 13 , no. 2 , article 29, 2015,
https://scholars.wlu.ca/thegoose/vol13/iss2/29.
Loving Animals: Toward a New Animal 
Advocacy by KATHY RUDY  
U of Minnesota P, 2011 $19.95 
 
Reviewed by ELANA SANTANA 
 
Kathy Rudy’s Loving Animals argues 
for a shift in the way humans relate to 
animals that comes about through a focus 
on affective relationships. Rudy divides her 
book into different ways that humans use 
animals: as pets, as food, in zoos, in 
laboratories, and for clothing (although this 
chapter uses clothing as a metaphor for 
identity and perceptions of subjectivity). 
Rudy suggests that a focus on particular 
affective relationships between humans 
and animals serves as a middle ground 
between radical animal liberationists and 
human-centred animal welfarists. Rudy’s 
central claim initially seems to echo much 
of what feminist animal studies and 
feminist ethics of care theories have 
argued. However, Rudy doesn’t reference 
the work of scholars such as Carol Adams or 
Josephine Donovan and overlooks the 
important critiques they might offer on her 
work. While claiming to “step outside that 
Western way of thinking, into a territory 
where we connect with animals at very 
corporeal levels,” Rudy’s book consistently 
falls in line with Western notions of human 
exceptionalism and puts forth a reductive 
and privileged approach to animal 
advocacy. A book about the importance of 
affect, particularity, and stories, in the work 
of shifting human-animal relations is both 
timely and crucial, yet Rudy misses this 
opportunity by keeping the human/animal 
binary in place throughout her book.  
 In her chapter about pets it is clear 
that she has firsthand knowledge of living 
with dogs and allowing for that experience 
to guide her approach to troubling 
normative human/animal relations. It’s her 
direct and particular experience living with 
and loving dogs that makes this section the 
most successful part of the book. In the 
next chapter Rudy goes on to talk about the 
horrors of factory farms and the merits of 
small “ethical” farms.  
 Loving Animals would benefit from a 
great deal more of what Rudy suggests 
throughout the book: letting animal 
subjects speak for themselves through 
stories. Instead Rudy offers the reader her 
own opinion—that some animals would 
want to sacrifice themselves for human 
benefit or that meat eating is okay only if 
one is able to drive 50 miles to small farms 
each week to pick up meat from farmers 
who at least gave their animals a good life. 
Rudy’s logic is flawed; she writes: 
  
Eating the flesh of animals you’ve known 
and loved, or paying farmers higher 
prices to provide those animals with a 
good life, can be seen as a good deal for 
those animals. They would not have the 
joy of living if they didn’t also make that 
sacrifice. The horror of factory farming 
moves farm animals indoors to 
intolerable lives, lives not worth living; 
but the movement toward veganism 
banishes them from the earth 
altogether.  
 
Her discussion of animal sanctuaries in 
chapter three stands in contrast to the idea 
that veganism must lead to banishing farm 
animals from the earth—why can’t these 
animals thrive and experience joy in the 
safety of animal sanctuaries as many of 
them already do? Or why can’t we promote 
more sustainable farms that provide 
animals very happy lives in exchange for 
their by-products? The idea that beings are 
better off being raised and then killed at the 
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hands of those who “loved” them, or 
experimented on by a scientist who “cared” 
for them, than to never have lived at all, is 
questionable, and I would argue that this 
betrayal is another version of the cruel fate 
that Rudy rebukes in her discussion of 
factory farms and lab animals. 
 In each of the stories Rudy tells 
there is a clear moral dilemma on the part 
of the pet owner, meat eater, or 
vivisectionist that Rudy fails to explore with 
depth. Instead, she defends their actions as 
long as she believes they are making an 
effort. I agree with Rudy that small changes 
are often better than none at all. If you are 
a pet owner, letting your particular love for 
the animal you live with seep into your 
relationships with other animals you may 
never come in contact with is a good thing. 
If you choose to eat meat it is of course 
better to get it from small, local, and ethical 
sources. And if your job involves 
experimentation on an animal it would be 
better if you confronted what it meant to 
know and care for that animal so that you 
might better understand all of the results of 
your experiment. However, it is the baseline 
of human exceptionalism from which 
Rudy’s arguments spring that blocks her 
ideas from contributing to radical shifts in 
how humans treat animals. Rudy’s 
insistence that she is not taking a radical 
position on animals, or any other issues, 
makes her focus on affect and corporeality 
rather tenuous. 
  Rudy’s position on animals is not 
only human-centred, it is privileged. She 
writes, “Let’s tell the world that we believe 
we owe animals a good life in return for 
their sacrifice, and we will gladly pay 
whatever the price to have meat that 
comes from animals that, while alive, knew 
joy, happiness, love, and peace.” Most 
working-class people, particularly working 
class people of colour, do not have the 
luxury of paying “whatever the price.” A 
more inclusive and social justice-minded 
alternative to Rudy’s proclamation is an 
approach to animal advocacy that accounts 
for varying levels of access to food and the 
environmental justice issues around factory 
farming. This could entail an animal 
advocacy that begins by destabilizing the 
human/animal binary and is sensitive to a 
diversity of socio-economic circumstances; 
for example, one that promotes local 
farmer’s markets and community gardens 
which best accommodate a vegetarian diet 
where animal by-products may be 
consumed but are from relatively happy 
animals who do not have to “sacrifice” their 
lives for the humans helping them to have 
that happy life. 
 I firmly agree with Rudy when she 
says that affect can “help us imagine better 
ways of sharing the planet with animals,” 
and that “affect is best displayed through 
stories.” I also agree with the points at 
which she sheds light on the complexity of 
human relationships with animals and that 
it is necessary to understand the context 
and story of each human-animal 
relationship before declaring what is best 
for the human or animal involved. However, 
I adamantly disagree that imagining that 
“some animals may be willing to sacrifice 
themselves for our benefit” is in any way 
engaging empathically or attentively with 
animals. This argument is presumptuous 
and mandates a speaking for animals that 
supports the privileged position of humans.  
 Much of her book reads as a 
personal quest to absolve herself of human 
guilt. Like white guilt, taking this position is 
a regressive step for justice politics. I find it 
helpful when thinking about animals to 
place the category of species next to the 
other constructed categories we navigate 
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daily: race, gender, ability, class, sexuality. 
Only when species is understood as 
simultaneously a tool for identifying a real 
material experience of being in the world 
and as a constructed category of systemic 
oppression can we begin to really shift our 
relationships with animals. If we 
understand species in this way, then 
honouring, empathizing, and advocating for 
the different beings we lump into one 
group called animals is a much more 
complex task than Rudy outlines in her 
book. Often the only way to begin this 
undertaking in our insidiously human-
centred world is to insert a human minority 
where we’ve written animals and then it is 
easier to feel deeply how troubling reform-
based justice politics can be.  
 Rudy’s book sets out towards a 
great ideal: to engage in animal advocacy by 
nurturing and highlighting our deep 
connections with animals “in order to see 
the world from their eyes, in order for them 
to become their own advocates through 
relationships with us. To tell their stories 
well we need to let them affect us.” 
However, the body of her book tells a very 
familiar story of human exceptionalism and 
a dismissal of the thing animal advocacy so 
desperately needs: an unapologetic, radical 
approach to justice politics which uses 
affect and stories to reveal the porosity of 
the boundary between humans and 
nonhumans. 
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environmental politics. She lives with and 
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